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Abstract
We study conict between two groups of individuals. Using Schaf-
fers (1988) concept of evolutionary stability we provide an evolution-
ary underpinning for in-group altruism combined with spiteful be-
havior towards members of the rival out-group. We characterize the
set of evolutionarily stable combinations of in-group favoritism and
out-group spite and nd that an increase in in-group altruism can be
balanced by a decrease in spiteful behavior towards the out-group.
Keywords: altruism, spite, in-group favoritism, conict, evolution-
ary stability, indirect evolutionary approach
1 Introduction
Consider individuals who are members of one group which competes with
another group. Social science has produced strong evidence of in-group
favoritism, i.e., a more positive attitude or behavior towards members of
the same group than towards members of a rival out-group (see, e.g., Brewer
1979 and Bernhard et al. 2006). This in-group favoritism emerges even
if the groups are not formed on the basis of common characteristics or
intrinsically aligned interests, but are simply generated by a random process
or by other ad hoc procedures (see, e.g., Tajfel and Turner, 1979).1 Moreover,
conict with an out-group is likely to strengthen in-group favoritism.2 In-
group altruism and spiteful behavior towards members of an out-group is
1For this minimal group paradigm see, for instance, Pinter and Greenwald (2011) who
compare di¤erent experimental methods for the induction of such minimal groups.
2Sherif et al. 1961; see also Stein (1976), Taifel (1982) and James (1987) for surveys of
early seminal contributions.
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an important dimension for in-group favoritism (see Mifune et al., 2010,
for altruism). We uncover a new reason why a whole set of combinations of
in-group altruism and spiteful attitudes towards members of the competing
out-group is evolutionarily stable and where in-group altruism and out-group
spite are substitutes to each other.
We apply a modication of the equilibrium concept of evolutionary stabil-
ity for nite populations, introduced and developed by Scha¤er (1988). We
use and extend this concept in the context of the "indirect approach", i.e.,
in an environment in which individuals are characterized by their preference
types, rather than hard wired actions. Within a nite population, an individ-
ual can improve its own relative standing not only by behavior that increases
the individuals own material payo¤, but also by activities that reduce the
material payo¤ of other players. Intuitively speaking, this observation is the
driving force in Scha¤ers (1988) framework, and it is also the driving force
for our results.
Conict environments in which single players ght with each other on an
individual basis have been well studied both in biology and in economics. For
the context with nite population size, the equilibrium in evolutionary stable
strategies in conict is often characterized by higher ghting e¤ort than in
the standard Nash equilibrium that emerges from simultaneous maximization
of material payo¤s (see, e.g., Leininger 2003). In contrast, we consider an
environment in which individuals ght in groups against each other, and in
which each member of a group makes his individual decision about own e¤ort
contribution to the own groups total ghting e¤ort. Hence, conict between
two groups involves a collective good problem within each group: members
of the group make contributions that improve the chances that the group
wins, and each has potentially an incentive to free-ride on the contributions
of other group members.3
From the perspective of evolutionary tness, the own e¤ort contributions
of a player have several aspects. Own contributions to group e¤ort have
a direct e¤ort cost to the player making this e¤ort. They reduce the win
probability for the competing group and increases the win probability for
the own group. The decrease in the win probability of the competing group
is benecial for the player, as it decreases the expected monetary payo¤
of members of the competing group. This increases the players material
payo¤ relative to that of the members of the rival group. The increase in
the win probability of his own group is a mixed blessing. It increases the
3The seminal paper that studied this problem is Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). It has
generated a large literature, including contributions by Baik et al. (2001), Davis and Reilly
(1999), Esteban and Ray (2001), Katz et al. (1990), Nitzan (1991), and Ursprung (1990).
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own expected material gain of the player. However, the increase in win
probability also increases the expected material payo¤ of all other members
of the own group (who did not have to bear the additional cost of this e¤ort).
In isolation, this latter e¤ect makes the individual less well-o¤ compared to
the other members of the own group.
The equilibrium in evolutionarily stable strategies that results from these
partially countervailing e¤ects is the starting point of our main analysis. The
main analysis asks whether the combination of in-group altruism and out-
group spite can be jointly established as evolutionarily stable preferences.
Formally we adopt the "indirect approach" that considers the evolution of
preferences rather than the evolution of actions introduced by Güth and Yaari
(1992) in the context of evolutionary game theory. It suggests that -rather
than actions being hard wired- individuals may be endowed with objective
functions and make optimizing decisions based on their objective functions.
These objective functions are genetically determined, but subject to possible
mutations and evolutionary selection pressure. This line of reasoning has
been used to provide an evolutionary foundation for a number of types of
other-regarding preferences.4 Di¤erent attitudes towards members of the own
group than towards members of the out-group may be desirable from an
evolutionary perspective. Indeed, our analysis conrms that a large set of
combinations of in-group altruism and spiteful preferences with respect to the
competing members in the out-group are evolutionarily stable preferences.
This set has the property that in-group altruism and spite toward the out-
group are substitutes.
We make use of a duality relationship that exists between evolutionarily
stable strategies (in terms of e¤ort choices) and evolutionarily stable pref-
erences. A suitable mixture of in-group altruism and spiteful preferences
towards members of the out-group can implement behavioral choices that
are in line with the evolutionarily stable strategies in the direct approach.
This duality exists in a framework where we assume that players cannot
observe the preference type of their co-players.
Previous research has analyzed several evolutionary explanations for al-
truism or spite.5 Altruism or harming or spiteful behavior have been derived
and explained by evolutionary arguments in the context of group selection,6
4Related to this approach, Frank (1987) highlighted the importance of strategic ef-
fects of other-regarding preference traits in strategic situations, and the implications for
evolution of preferences.
5For recent reviews and contributions in evolutionary biology see Lehmann and Keller
(2006), West and Gardner (2010) and Marshall (2011).
6Smirnov et al. (2007), for instance, survey the literature on the willingness to take
major risks, including the risk to sacrice ones own life. They o¤er an evolutionary expla-
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and kin selection7 focussing on relatedness and inclusive tness. Our expla-
nation does not use any argument that is related to kin selection.
Altruism, spite, and other types of other-regarding preferences have also
been shown to be evolutionarily stable in a framework in which players can
observe other playerspreference types and where they can base their be-
havioral choices in an interaction with another player on the preference type
of this other player. Evolutionary stability of other-regarding preferences
has generated considerable interest inside economics.8 An important paper
that is closest in spirit to our research question and considers competition
between groups is Eaton et al. (2011) who also aim at an explanation of
in-group favoritism. They consider a framework which combines two dis-
tinct action choices: production e¤ort and appropriation e¤ort in a model
of conict. In-group altruism may develop along one activity dimension and
out-group spite may develop along the second activity dimension in this con-
text, and the combination of both types of other-regarding preferences in
one model approach nicely addresses the well-documented phenomenon of
in-group favoritism. They consider an innitely large population and what
is sometimes called the transparent dispositionapproach, in the spirit of
Bester and Güth (1998). The driving force for evolutionary stability of these
two types of other-regarding preferences in their context is type observabil-
ity. In our framework, the combination of in-group favoritism and spiteful
behavior toward the out-group emerges from one single activity, and the evo-
lutionarily stability of the combination of in-group altruism and out-group
spite emerges, even though other playerstypes are not observable. In the
context of evolutionary biology, a variant of these considerations can be found
based on repeated interaction and/or non-additive tness consequences (see
Fletcher and Doebeli 2006, 2009). A related e¤ect has been studied as the
phenomenon of "greenbeards", where altruistic behavior is conditional on
relatedness of the recipient (see, e.g., Gardner and West 2009 and West and
Gardner 2010). This selective behavior requires that strategies are condi-
tioned on co-playerstypes; hence, it requires that other playerstypes are
(at least partially) observable. Our approach does not rely on this mechanism
nation, based on group selection. Bowles (2009) analyses a related argument, considering
whether a group selection argument can be based on the structure and interaction of
groups in ancestral hunter-gatherer societies. For a discussion of group selection see, e.g.,
Sober and Wilson (1998), and for more critical views Reeve (2000) and Maynard Smith
(1998), and Salomonsson (2010) for a recent survey on the group selection controversy.
7For a survey on altruism and spite in the context of kin selection see West and Gardner
(2010).
8See, e.g., Güth and Yaari (1992), Sethi (1996), Bester and Güth (1998), Huck and
Oechssler (1999), Koçkesen, Ok and Sethi (2000), Dufwenberg and Güth (2000), Ok and
Vega-Redondo (2001), Abreu and Sethi (2003), and Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2007).
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and does not require observability of type or relatedness.
Our approach has two important key aspects: rst, we consider nite
population size. This makes the consequences of a players actions on other
playersmonetary payo¤ relevant for his tness. Second, we consider conict
as taking place between two groups that do not cooperate internally. The
inter-group competition aspect distinguishes our framework from evolution-
ary models of conict between single individuals.9 It allows us to address the
phenomenon of in-group favoritism and the role of out-group competition
for this attitude. Also, inter-group competition generates scope for a richer
type space, by which the typedescribes the behavior or the preference to-
wards members of the in-group that can di¤er from the behavior towards the
out-group - a complexity that cannot emerge in individual playerscontests.10
Social psychology explained in-group favoritism relating to concepts of so-
cial identity and social comparison (see Tajfel and Turner 1979 for an outline)
and by the realistic group conict theory(Sherif et al. 1961) as a theory
for describing the role of an out-group for in-group favoritism. Recent work
traces physiological roots of in-group favoritism using twin studies (Lewis
and Bates 2010) and neuroimaging (Mathur et al. 2010). Our analysis com-
plements these theories, showing that a genetic underpinning for in-group
altruism combined with spiteful attitudes towards the rival out-group proves
to be evolutionarily stable.
In the next section 2 we characterize the state game with two rival groups.
We then consider evolutionarily stable strategies in the inter-group conict
in section 3. In section 4 we make use of a duality property to show that
these evolutionarily stable strategies can be induced by evolutionarily stable
preferences that exhibit in-group altruism and spite towards members of the
out-group. Then we conclude.
9For conict between individuals, Konrad (2004) found an evolutionarily stable bimor-
phism in which some share of the population has altruistic preferences and the other share
has spiteful preferences. He rules out narrowly selsh behavior as a possible preference
type, however, which discounts his result. In the context of conict, Eaton and Eswaran
(2003) and Leininger (2009) studied evolutionary stability of preferences in contests be-
tween individuals and also found evolutionary foundations for spiteful preferences.
10In a late stage of this work we became aware of a paper by Eaton et al. (2011), who
also consider at the framework of in-group favoritism with out-group competitors. Their
analysis is based on observability of types - hence their results are essentially based on a
combination of known results about evolutionary stability of altruism (as in Bester and
Güth 1998) and spite (Eaton and Eswaran 2003).
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2 The state game
We consider an environment in which a nite set N of 2n of players i consti-
tutes the set of players who participate in the following state game.11 The
players are partitioned in two alliance groups of equal size, denoted as group
A and group B, each consisting of n players. The conict between the two
groups is described by a ght that is mapped by a Tullock (1980) lottery
contest12 as follows: all players i simultaneously and independently expend
an e¤ort xi  0, which is also equal to their material cost of expending this
e¤ort. E¤orts of members of the same group sum up to the total group ef-
fort, XA = i2Axi and XB = i2Bxi, respectively. These total group e¤orts
determine the win probabilities for group A and B, respectively. Group A
wins the contest with a probability
pA(XA; XB) =
XA
XA +XB
if XA +XB > 0 (1)
and with a probability pA(XA; XB) = 1=2 if XA+XB = 0. With the comple-
mentary probability pB = 1   pA group B wins the contest. This mapping
(1) is often referred to as the Tullock lottery contest success function.
If group K 2 fA;Bg wins the contest, each member of the alliance K
receives an equal amount Q(n). The members of the losing alliance receive
nothing, but have to bear their cost of e¤ort. In general, Q can, but need
not be a trivial function of n. For instance, Q = Q0=n refers to the one
extreme case case where the prize of winning of monetary size Q0 is a private
good that is evenly shared within the group; Q(n)  Q0 refers to the case in
which the prize of winning is a group-specic public good and all members
of the group value the public good symmetrically. Values of Q < Q0=n are
also feasible and emerge, for instance, if there is some ghting inside the
winner group about how to allocate the prize between them.13 This setup
determines the material payo¤ of a player as a function of his own e¤ort, the
e¤ort choices of the co-players with whom he is matched in the given state
game, and the outcome of the respective lottery according to (1). For given
11The state game here is essentially the static game that is analysed by the literature
on inter-group contests, following the tradition of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966).
12See chapter 2.3 in Konrad (2009) for a survey on the di¤erent elds (rent-seeking, mil-
itary conict, marketing, sports) in which this contest has been developed independently
as a tool to describe conict, for axiomatic foundations such as Skaperdas (1996), and for
a survey on existing microeconomic foundations for this decision rule.
13See, for instance, Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) and Wärneryd (1998) for the analysis
of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in this context if players care only about their own
absolute material payo¤.
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choices (x1; :::; x2n)  x 2 R2n+ the material payo¤ of a player i in group
K 2 fA;Bg is
i = pK(x)Q  xi. (2)
This material payo¤consists of the material benet which i enjoys if is group
wins times the probability that is group wins, minus the actual ghting e¤ort
which i contributed to the ghting e¤ort of his group. This material payo¤
can be interpreted as an expected value if pK is a probability. Alternatively,
pK need not be interpreted as a probability of winning, but as a share in the
total prize, with the total prize being split between the two groups according
to shares pK and (1   pK). These two interpretations are used equivalently
in the rent-seeking literature, if players are risk-neutral. Focussing simply
on expected material payo¤, we disregard this possible distinction in what
follows.
3 Evolutionarily stable strategies
We now search for an equilibrium in evolutionarily stable strategies and ask
which xi = xE for all i 2 N is an evolutionarily stable strategy. This implies
that we concentrate on the case in which the equilibrium in evolutionarily
stable strategies is a monomorphism, i.e., characterized by a single e¤ort level
xE. We assume that mutations from such a monomorphism may happen, but
we restrict the types of mutations that can emerge to one single mutant type
at a time. That is, starting from a homogenous population in which all
players follow the strategy xE, a mutant player may appear who chooses a
di¤erent e¤ort xM .
We can now provide a denition for a monomorphic equilibrium in evolu-
tionarily stable strategies that rests on the denition of stability introduced
by Scha¤er (1988). In this denition, the set of material payo¤s of players
i 2 N is the determinant of evolutionary success as follows:
Denition 1: The strategy xE > 0 is an evolutionarily stable strategy if xE
is a solution to
max
xi
[i(xi;x
E
 i)   i(xi;xE i)]; (3)
where
i(xi;x
E
 i) =
(n  1)xE + xi
(2n  1)xE + xiQ  xi, (4)
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 i(xi;xE i) =
n  1
2n  1

(n  1)xE + xi
(2n  1)xE + xiQ  x
E

(5)
+
n
2n  1

nxE
(2n  1)xE + xiQ  x
E

and xE i is the vector of the e¤orts of all 2n  1 players other than i, who all
choose xE.
In words, i(xi;xE i) as in (4) is the expected material payo¤ of a player
i who chooses e¤ort xi given that all other players choose e¤ort xE, and
 i(xi;xE i) as in (5) is the expected material payo¤ of a player who chooses
xE if all but one other players also choose xE, and this one other player
chooses e¤ort xi. This one other player may belong to the same group as
player i, which happens with a probability n 1
2n 1 and to the rival group with
a probability n
2n 1 .
Denition 1 is taken directly from Scha¤er (1988). It formalizes the stan-
dard idea of evolutionary stability, but for a nite population. A population
which consists of players who all follow the strategy xE is evolutionarily sta-
ble if it cannot be successfully invaded by a mutant who chooses a mutant
strategy xM = xi. According to this denition, suppose there is a mutant
playing xi. If this mutant has a strictly higher payo¤ than the average payo¤
of the non-mutants who all choose xE, then this violates the property that
xE is a solution to (3), and this mutant does better than the average player in
the group of non-mutants. Due to the association in groups, the mutant be-
longs to one of the groups and plays against a homogeneous group consisting
of players who all choose xE. This in turn yields di¤erent material payo¤s to
the non-mutants, depending on whether they are in the same group as the
mutant, or in the rival group.
The rst-order condition14 for a maximum of (3) evaluated at xi = xE
yields
xE =
1
2
Q
2n  1 ; (6)
and total e¤ort per group is equal to
XE =
1
2
Qn
2n  1 .
We summarize this as
14Note that the second derivative of

i(xi;x
E
 i)  E i(xi;xE i)

is strictly negative for
all possible values of xE > 0, and that the rst marginal unit of e¤ort x at x = xE = 0
has a positive impact on the value of

i(xi;x
E
 i)  E i(xi;xE i)

.
8
Theorem 1 A symmetric equilibrium in evolutionarily stable strategies of
the inter-group contest is described by e¤ort choices xE = 1
2
Q
2n 1 .
This result shows that the evolutionarily stable strategy is increasing in Q
and decreasing in the size of the total population. For instance, if Q(n) = Q0
(the pure public goods case), individual contributions converge towards zero
as the population size becomes very large. However, total contributions of
each group converge towards 1=4.15 If Q = Q0=n (the pure private goods
case), individual contributions and total group e¤orts converge to zero as
n!1.
4 Evolutionarily stable preferences
We can now consider evolutionary stability in the context of the evolution
of preferences, in line with the indirect approach introduced by Güth and
Yaari (1992). A players material payo¤ relative to other playersmaterial
payo¤s determines evolutionary success. However, rather than considering
evolutionary strategies (xed e¤ort choices in the context here) and their
evolutionary success, we allow players to di¤er in their subjective utilities,
assuming that the players consciously maximize their subjective utility by
their choices of actions, as in a strategic game. Playerstypes will be dened
based on their subjective preferences and their beliefs about the preferences
of others. Mutations and evolutionary selection then operates on the set of
possible preference/belief types.
To be more specic, in each state game there is, again, a set N of players
i. The players are randomly partitioned into the two groups A and B. Each
player has a set of possible strategies xi 2 [0;1) and chooses freely from
this set. All playerschoices are made simultaneously, and the two aggre-
gate group e¤orts enter into the contest function and determine which of
the groups wins with a prize Q. This prize is allocated to each member of
the winning group, just as described in section 2. The denition of material
payo¤ of players also remains as in (2). Players do not necessarily maximize
this material payo¤, however. Instead, each player has a subjective utility,
where this utility function characterizes an individuals type. We later ask
which subjective utility is evolutionarily stable - with a denition of evolu-
tionarily stable utility given further below. We are interested in the possible
role of in-group altruism and spiteful preferences towards the members of
15Not surprisingly, for n ! 1, the equilibrium in evolutionarily stable strategies co-
incides with the Nash equilibrium of intergroup contests, which is well studied and well
known.
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the out-group. Therefore, we consider the following parametric version of
subjective utility of player i in group A as a function of material payo¤s of
all players,
Ui(ai; si) = i + ai
X
j2Anfig
j   si
X
j2B
j, (7)
where i is is own material payo¤, the second term is the sum of the material
payo¤s of all players who are in the same group as i, and the third term is the
sum of material payo¤s of all players who are in the other group. Further
ai  0 and si  0 are the utility weights given to the monetary payo¤s
of other in-group players j 2 Anfig and out-group players in set B. A
strictly positive value of ai measures is in-group altruism, a strictly positive
si measures spiteful feelings vis-à-vis members of the rival, out-group B.
The space of possible subjective utilities for members of group B is dened
analogously. Accordingly, the preference type of a player i is determined by
a pair (ai; si).
To complete the description of the state game, we have to specify the
information assumptions and playersbeliefs that apply. Playerspreference
types are private information: each player knows his own type, but not that
of others. Players cannot observe the preference type of other players, but
nevertheless need to have or form beliefs about other playerstypes. Together
with a players preference parameters, the players beliefs are part of the
characterization of the players type. We rst dene robust beliefs.
Denition 2: Suppose player i 2 N has preference parameters (ai; si). This
players belief about his co-playerstypes is a robust belief if i beliefs that all
other players j 2 Nnfig are also of preference type (ai; si) with probability
1.
In what follows we assume that all players have robust beliefs as dened
in Denition 2. Hence, a players type is fully characterized by a pair of pref-
erence parameters (ai; si), and beliefs about other players that are identical
with the players own preference type.
We note several properties of robust beliefs. First, in a monomorphism
of evolutionarily stable preferences all players have the same preference pa-
rameters. It follows directly that players beliefs are consistent with the
true distribution of types in each evolutionarily stable equilibrium. Beliefs
are incorrect whenever the population N consists of individuals with di¤er-
ent preferences, i.e., outside a monomorphism of evolutionarily stable prefer-
ences. These two properties are important and nice features of robust beliefs.
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They can be seen as the evolutionary-equilibrium analogon to the require-
ment in Bayesian Nash equilibrium that beliefs must be correct along the
equilibrium path - but not for out-of-equilibrium outcomes.
Second, robust beliefs allow to solve for what we call the symmetric
robust-beliefs Nash equilibrium e¤ort of each player type, for any given true
distribution of types among all other players. In fact, for robust beliefs,
the player has a dominant choice and can be characterized as follows. Let
xi = (x

i ; x

i ; :::; x

i ) be the vector of e¤orts in the symmetric Nash equi-
librium of mutually optimal replies if all players are of type (ai; si) and
maximize (7). Then the dominant choice that maximizes (7) for player i
given his preferences (ai; si) and his robust beliefs is xi = xi . This implies
that, should all players are of the same type (ai; si), they end up with e¤ort
choices (xi ; x

i ; :::; x

i ). Should some players have di¤erent preference parame-
ters, the e¤ort choice of player i of type (ai; si) is still uniquely determined
and equal to xi = xi , for any possible type (ai; si).
Note that, for a set of players with heterogenous preference parameters,
this choice behavior will not be ex post optimal, as the players are surprised
about the e¤ort choices by others. However, such surprises occur only out
of the equilibrium in evolutionarily stable preferences. Note also that the
assumption of robust beliefs and the playerschoice behavior that is implied
is convenient for the formal analysis, but does not drive our results. Our
main result does not rely on this choice of beliefs.16
The assumption of unobservability of types is a major departure from
the evolutionary literature on altruism. Observability of preference types is
frequently assumed in the context of the indirect approach, starting with
Frank (1987). Type observability has strategic implications: a players type
may induce the equilibrium actions of co-players, and a change in a players
type can therefore cause a change in co-players equilibrium actions. As has
been shown by Bester and Güth (1998), the direction of this strategic e¤ect
of a players own type for co-playersactions is crucial for the evolutionary
success of particular preference traits, including altruism. With observed
altruism or spite parameters, these induce a strategic e¤ect on other players:
other players optimal e¤ort choices become a function of the preference
type of player i, as they anticipate that player is e¤ort choice depends on
is own preference, and di¤erent choices xi induce di¤erent optimal replies
for other players. We depart from this observability assumption, because
the assumption of observability is a strong and empirically less plausible
16Note that in an evolutionary context in which the distribution of types develops sto-
chastically and is endogenous, the standard concept of Bayesian beliefs with all players
types being random draws from a commonly known distribution does not work.
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assumption, and because the strategic e¤ect of type observability is known
and well understood. This also implies that our ndings on evolutionarily
stable altruism and spite are not based on this strategic e¤ect.
We now ask which combination of (aE; sE) is an evolutionarily stable
type in the following sense. Let all 2n   1 players be of type (aE; sE) and
let one individual i be of type (ai; si). If (ai; si) 6= (aE; sE) we call this
individual i a mutant. Evolutionary stability of preferences in the line of
reasoning of Scha¤er (1988) is a property about the relative advantages of this
preference type given the uniform preferences of all other players. Suppose
that 2n   1 players follow subjective utility maximization according to a
given type characterized by (aE; sE). Let there be a single mutant with
(ai; si) di¤erent from (aE; sE). Let i((ai; si); (a; s)
E) be the material payo¤
obtained in the robust-belief Nash equilibrium by the mutant if the mutant
and all other players maximize their own subjective utilities and have robust
beliefs, where (a; s)E denotes the vector ((aE; sE); :::; (aE; sE)) of preference
types of all individuals other than i. Further, let  i((a; s); (a; s)
E) be the
material payo¤obtained in this equilibrium by each of the other 2n 1 players
who maximize their own subjective utilities and are of type (aE; sE). An
adaptation of Scha¤ers stability criterion for evolutionarily stable preference
types then is as follows:
Denition 3: The preference (aE; sE) is an evolutionarily stable preference
if (aE; sE) is a solution to
max
(ai;si)
[i((ai; si); (a; s)
E)   i((ai; si); (a; s)E)] (8)
Using this denition we can now state our main result:
Theorem 2 Let P = f(a; s)
a  0 and s  0 and a = 1(2n 1)(n 1)   n(n 1)sg.
Then each (a; s) 2 P constitutes an equilibrium in evolutionarily stable pref-
erences with robust beliefs.
Proof. Let us denote the (2n  1)-dimensional vector of xj = xE for j 6= i
as xE i. We make the following three observations:
Observation 1 : Let (aE; sE) 2 P. Suppose all individuals have these
preference parameters and robust beliefs. In this case
xj =
1
4
Q
1 + a(n  1) + sn
n
 y for all j = 1; :::,2n (9)
is a set of mutually optimal replies. We call this a Nash equilibrium with
robust beliefs.
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To conrm this observation, suppose that some player i anticipates that
all other players choose this e¤ort y, i.e. xE i = (y; :::; y). In this case, player
i with preference parameters (ai; si) chooses an e¤ort that maximizes
Ui((ai; si);x
E
 i) =
xi + (n  1)y
xi + (2n  1)yQ  xi
+ai(n  1)

xi + (n  1)y
xi + (2n  1)yQ  y

 sin

ny
xi + (2n  1)yQ  y

This maximization problem has a unique interior solution at xi = y, as can
be shown as follows. From
@Ui((ai; si);x
E
 i)
@xi
=
nyQ
(xi + (2n  1)y)2
(1 + ai (n  1) + sn)  1
=
(2ny)2
(xi + (2n  1)y)2
  1
it follows that @Ui((a; s);xE i)=@xi is strictly positive at xi = 0 and strictly
decreasing in xi. The non-zero symmetric solution is xi = y where y is given
in (9).
Observation 2 : The set of (ai; si) that implements e¤ort choices y = xE (=
1
2
Q
2n 1) in the symmetric Nash equilibrium with robust beliefs is characterized
by ai = 1(2n 1)(n 1)   n(n 1)si.
For Observation 2 to be true it must hold that xE = y, or 1
2
Q
2n 1 =
1
4
Q1+ain ai+sin
n
. Solving this for ai as a function of si yields
ai =
1
(2n  1) (n  1)  
n
(n  1)si:
Observation 3 : Consider a possible mutant player i in a population in
which all other players j 6= i have preference parameters (aE; sE) 2 P . By
Observation 1, choices of players j 6= i are given by x i = xE i, independent
of the actual preference parameters of player i. Given this behavior of other
players, consider player i and his material payo¤. Theorem 1 revealed that
the e¤ort choice that maximizes is evolutionary tness in this case is xi = xE.
Accordingly, the set of preferences (ai; si) that maximizes is material payo¤
in the preference domain is equal to the set of preferences (ai; si) that induce
xi = x
E given xj = xE for all other j. Observations 1 and 2 revealed that all
(ai; si) 2 P induce this e¤ort choice. This concludes the proof.
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Figure 1: In-group altruism and out-group spite are substitutes.
Theorem 2 is our main result. It shows that there is a whole set of com-
binations of preference parameters that, if all individuals have these prefer-
ences, the symmetric Nash equilibrium with robust beliefs induced by these
subjective utilities has e¤ort choices that are the same as the evolutionar-
ily stable equilibrium strategies that were characterized in Theorem 1. The
function
aE(sE) =
1
(2n  1) (n  1)  
n
(n  1)s
E (10)
describes the set of pairs (aE; sE) that constitute evolutionarily stable prefer-
ences. Evolutionary stability therefore allows for a number of combinations
of in-group altruism and spiteful attitudes towards the members of the out-
group. The function (10) also shows that more in-group altruism comes
together with less spiteful behavior towards the out-group: in-group altru-
ism and spite towards members of the out-group are substitutes as regards
aE(sE). Furthermore, as the group size n becomes large, in-group altruism
and out-group spite become less pronounced. Figure 1 illustrates this rela-
tionship for n = 2, n = 3, and n = 5, with the weight for altruism aE in (7)
on the y axis, and the weight sE measuring spite in (7) on the x axis.
The intuition for this negative relationship is as follows. Starting from a
situation along the frontier aE(sE), if a player has higher altruism towards
the members of his group, in isolation this induces the player to make higher
contributions to group e¤ort. In comparison to the evolutionarily stable
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e¤ort choices in Theorem 1, this e¤ort choice is "too high". In order to bring
the e¤ort that maximizes the players subjective utility back in line with the
e¤ort level that is characterized in Theorem 1, an appropriate reduction in
spiteful behavior towards the members of the rival group is desirable, as a
reduction in s will reduce the e¤ort that maximizes the players subjective
utility.
It is important to note that the evolutionary stability of in-group altruism
and out-group spite in Theorem 2 has a di¤erent, and new reason, compared
to the approach taken by Frank (1987), Bester and Güth (1998) and others.
That a player is an altruist in this framework does not induce a behavioral
reaction by other players that benet the altruist. This strategic e¤ect
channel is the basis for evolutionarily stable behavioral attitudes in many
other analyses, but this channel is closed in our framework by the assumption
of robust beliefs. Whether a player is an altruist or not does not a¤ect the
e¤ort choices of all other players if they have robust beliefs. Given their
beliefs, all other players are essentially guided only by their own preference
parameters. Nevertheless, in the evolutionary equilibrium, the beliefs about
other playerstypes and about their e¤ort choices are perfectly consistent.
Out of the evolutionary equilibrium, with robust beliefs, players may have
the wrong perceptions about the types of their co-players and need not antici-
pate their e¤ort choices correctly. This emphasizes the absence of a strategic
e¤ect of the type. A mutant who enters into an otherwise homogeneous
population does not induce them to make di¤erent choices. An inconsistency
of this concept seemingly is that the mutant has wrongbeliefs about the
preferences of the population which he tries to invade and does not correctly
anticipate other playerse¤ort choices in this case. But as the state game is
a single shot game, there is no way the mutant can learn, update beliefs and
adjust behavior. Moreover, for the evolutionary stability of elements of the
preference set P, the specic belief of the mutant about the other players
types is not important. This can be conrmed as follows. Suppose that,
unlike in the proof of Theorem 2, the mutant with preference parameters
(a; s) assumes that all other players are of preference types (aE; sE), and as
mutations are extremely rare, these other players believe that all players in
N are of preference type (aE; sE). In this case it turns out that again the set
of preference parameters in the set P constitute the set of preferences that
fulll the criterion of evolutionarily stable preferences in Denition 3.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we show that in-group altruism together with out-group spite
can be explained as being the preference parameters of evolutionarily sta-
ble subjective utility in a framework with two groups which ght with each
other. This result provides an evolutionary explanation for the strong in-
group favoritism that is empirically well established for groups that are in
conict with other groups. We have also seen that spite and altruism are
substitutes in the functional relationship that describes the full set of evolu-
tionarily stable preference types, and that the role of altruism and spite is
more important the smaller the groups are. For very large groups the amount
of spite and altruism that is evolutionarily stable converges to zero. These
comparative static properties about the role of group size yield an empirically
testable hypothesis about in-group favoritism.
In order to address unobservability of types in an evolutionary context
we introduced a new concept of belief types: robust beliefs. This concept is
compatible with a stochastic and unobserved change in the distribution of
types in the population, and still allows for the beliefs to be consistent in the
equilibrium of evolutionarily stable strategies.
We note, however, that our results on evolutionary stability are not driven
by this framework of beliefs. It is also important to note that the evolution-
ary argument that supports in-group altruism and out-group spite here is
di¤erent from some of the arguments that have been used to provide an evo-
lutionary foundation for altruism between individuals. First, the foundation
here does not depend on considerations of kin-selection, or even of group-
selection. To demonstrate this, we may allow for a complete re-grouping
of the members (or their descendants) of the two groups between one state
game and the next, without altering the analysis or the results at all. Sec-
ond the argument does not build on strategic behavioral e¤ects that might
emerge if preference types are observable by others. This channel by which
altruism and other types of other-regarding preferences have been established
previously is strictly closed here by the unobservability of types.
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